The current landscape of the Middle East reveals profound and sweeping changes, driven not solely by the long-standing Israeli-Palestinian conflict but also by a range of social and political shifts reshaping both domestic and foreign policies across the region. The war in Gaza, in particular, promises to catalyze issues once deemed untouchable in the short to medium term—issues that many believed would be deferred to a distant and uncertain future.
The Arab world finds itself ensnared in a clear contradiction: its handling of the political and military ambitions of religious organizations operating outside state frameworks, such as Hamas in Palestine, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Houthis in Yemen, juxtaposed against an almost hypnotic pull towards the "resistance discourse" that these groups propagate in their confrontation with Israel. This internal political project, inseparable from the rhetoric of resistance, has expanded its influence over the past two decades, largely due to the crisis that engulfed the "nation-state" in several key Arab countries.
Political Islam, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, initially experienced remarkable political successes, only for these gains to swiftly unravel into failures, as evidenced in Egypt and Tunisia following the so-called Arab Spring revolutions. In contrast, the Gulf States managed to avoid being drawn into the "fundamentalist conflict" that has engulfed much of the Arab world, where Sunni and Shia religious factions had been developing deeper, more ambitious projects fueled by the expansionist goals of regional powers.
These factions' strategy capitalized on the fragility and fragmentation of the nation-state in the Levant, the Fertile Crescent, and Yemen, aiming for the emergence of fundamentalist states or quasi-states sustained by a cause long cherished by the average Arab citizen—the Palestinian cause. However, the social, cultural, and economic projects of these groups have not matured to a level that would enable them to exert full political dominance. Instead, deep schisms and rivalries have emerged with other political forces within their respective countries.
The survival of these sectarian, exclusionary military projects has hinged almost entirely on their investment in the Arab-Israeli conflict, even though they lack the strategic foresight and proper readiness to confront Israel effectively. This shortsightedness was starkly exposed by Hamas's rash decision to launch an attack on Israeli territories adjacent to Gaza on October 7, 2023—an action that triggered catastrophic consequences for the Gaza Strip, without any consideration by Hamas leadership of a viable "day-after" scenario.
Hezbollah's subsequent ill-fated attempt to exploit the Gaza crisis and escalate tensions with Tel Aviv further revealed the vulnerabilities of these groups, threatening their very existence. Israel's military responded with a ferocity that far exceeded the calculations of both Hamas and Hezbollah, who had gravely misjudged the limits of Prime Minister Netanyahu's government.
Both Hamas and Hezbollah had deluded themselves into believing that their rhetoric of "united fronts" and the threat of a comprehensive war waged by Iran's trio of proxies—Hamas, the Houthis, and Hezbollah—would deter the Israeli government and its far-right allies from launching large-scale military operations in Palestinian territories, Lebanon, or Yemen. However, these groups now face major setbacks following Israel's defiance of their assumptions, a result of flawed political and strategic planning. Their approach to the conflict failed to account for Israel's superior military, technological, and scientific capabilities, which they grossly underestimated.
The same factors that shielded Egypt and the Gulf States from falling into the trap of these fundamentalist organizations in recent years—most notably, strict measures taken to safeguard the nation-state from fundamentalist ideologies, political Islam, and intellectual extremism—are precisely the factors absent in other societies, plunging them into chaos. The Middle East remains unique in its continued production of religious fundamentalist leaders who play prominent political roles, posing an existential challenge to the nation-state and its secular, civil foundations. This phenomenon has stifled political and social progress in many parts of the region where such groups have entrenched themselves—often under the guise of resisting Israel—since the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1928.
The Cold War further cemented the political utility of these religious groups and their leaders in the broader East-West struggle, allowing them to entrench themselves in Middle Eastern societies. This dynamic persisted until Western political elites, long resigned to the notion that political Islam was an inescapable force in the region, began reassessing their positions. Notably, these Western elites typically only reevaluate their stance toward such organizations when their direct interests are at risk, or when Israel faces a tangible threat that forces a significant policy shift. This pattern is evidenced recently by the international silence regarding the intense bombardment of Gaza and Beirut's southern suburbs.
Conversely, the reckless actions of non-state actors, whether in Palestine or Lebanon, have provoked serious questions among ordinary citizens. These individuals have borne the brunt of death, hunger, and displacement as a result of poorly considered decisions, even when made in the name of resisting occupation. The monopolization of decision-making in Gaza and the dominance over Lebanon's political direction are two sides of the same coin, exemplifying the flaws of organizations that claim a monopoly on truth and view their rule as a divine mandate.
These groups have wielded immense authoritarian power and served projects that, paradoxically, have contributed significantly to the dissolution of the Palestinian cause. Their rogue, unilateral policies, which silenced opposing voices and made critical, fateful decisions in isolation, have led to the dire circumstances we witness today.
Looking ahead, clear indicators suggest that the era of "militant fundamentalism" is approaching its twilight. Internal failures and the inability to effectively manage confrontations with Israel have become increasingly apparent. Israel has demonstrated that strategies relying solely on mass mobilization and ideological rhetoric, without a solid foundation in economic and military strength, ultimately lead to substantial failure, reshaping the balance of power.
We are likely on the verge of witnessing the eclipse of fundamentalism and the emergence of a new reality. This shift could pave the way for greater unity behind the nation-state and the formulation of mature, lasting resolutions to the region's most pressing challenges.
